Apology Series Foreword Reading Guide Acknowledgment Introduction：Setting the Scene 0.1 Whither Away7 0.2 The Art of Compromise 0.2.1 Nonsense upon Stilts 0.2.2 Social Contracts 0.2.3 Reform 0.2.4 The Original Position 0.2.5 Bargaining 0.3 Moral Philosophy 0.3.1 Traditional Philosophical Categories 0.3.2 Fin de Siecle 0.4 Noncooperative Game Theory 0.4.1 The Ultimatum Gaxne 0.4.2 Anomalies7 0.5 Cooperative Game Theory 0.5.1 Games in Coalitional Form 0.6 Nash Program 0.7 Implementation 1 Nuances of Negotiation 1.1 Realistic Bargaining Models 1.2 Bargaining Problems 1.2.1 Payoff Regions 1.2.2 Nash Bargaining Problems 1.2.3 The Bargaining Set 1.2.4 Dividing the Dollar 1.2.5 Edgeworth Box 1.3 Bargaining Solutions 1.3.1 Nash Bargaining Solution 1.3.2 Kalai—Smorodinsky Solution 1.3.3 Bargaining with Interpersonal Comparison 1.4 Characterizing Bargaining Solutions 1.4.1 The Kalai—Smorodinsky Axioms 1.4.2 The Nash Axioms 1.4.3 Renegotiation Axioms 1.5 Bargaining with Commitment 1.5.1 Nash Demand Game 1.5.2 Fixed and Variable Threats 1.6 Trustless Transactions 1.6.1 Repeated Games 1.6.2 Transitional Arrangements 1.7 Bargaining without Commitment 1.7.1 The Alternating Ofiers Game 1.7.2 How Realistic iS Rubinstein』S Model7 1.8 Other Approaches to Bargaining 1.8.1 The Coase Theorem 1.8.2 Gauthier on Bargaining over a Social Contract
2 Evolution in Edell 2.1 The Good，the Right，and the Seemly 2.2 Utilitarianism 2.2.1 Summum Bonum 2.2.2 Ipsedixists 2.2.3 Ideal Observers 2.2.4 Philosopher—King 2.2.5 The Social Contract Approach 2.2.6 Rule—Utilitarianism or Act.Utilitarianism7 2.2.7 The Big Picture 2.3 Fictitious Postulatum7 2.3.1 Interpersonal Comparison of Utility 2.4 Evolutionary Ethics 2.5 Evolution and Justice 2.5.1 Reciprocity 2.5.2 Kinship 2.5.3 Equilibrium Selection 2.5.4 Empathy and Fairness 2.5.5 The Long and the Short and the Medium 2.6 Nonteleological Utilitarianism 2.6.1 Commitment in Eden 2.6.2 Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run 2.6.3 Retelling the Rawlsian Story 2.7 Morality as a Short.Run Phenomenon 2.7.1 The Princess and the Pea 2.7.2 HOW Justice Wbrks 2.8 Why Not Utilitarianism7 3 Rationalizing Reciprocity 3.1 Back-scratching 3.2 Rights in a Theory of the Seemly 3.2.1 mghts as Strategies7 3.2.2 Rules for Sustaining an Equilibrium 3.2.3 Moral Responsibility 3.2.4 nee WiU 3.2.5 Nil Desperandum 3.3 FOlk Theorem 3.3.1 Memes 3.3.2 Finite Automata 3.3.3 Computing Payoffs 3.3.4 Reciprocal Sharing 3.3.5 Crime and Punishment 3.3.6 Guardians Who Guard Each Other 3.3.7 Tit for Tat7 3.3.8 HOW Does Cooperation Evolve7 3.4 Social Contracts in Big Societies 3.4.1 Social Transfers 3.4.2 niendship and Coalitions 3.4.3 Police Forces 3.4.4 Punishing the Innocent 3.4.5 Leadership and Authority
3.5 The Role of the Emotions 3.5.1 Sore Thumbs 3.5.2 Tunnel Vision 3.6 Due Process 3.6.1 Anarchy to Statehood 3.6.2 Natural Equilibrium 3.7 Renegotiation 3.7.1 Getting from Here to There 3.7.2 Renegotiation in the Original Position 3.7.3 Making the Punishment Fit the Crime 3.7.4 Renegotiation—Proofness 3.8 What about Moral Values7 3.8.1 Confusing Tastes and Values 3.8.2 Das Adam Smith Problem 3.8.3 Postwelfarism 3.8.4 What Moral Relativism Is Not 4 Yearning for Utopia 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Envy 4.3 Equity in Economics 4.3.1 Envy—Freeness 4.3.2 welfarism 4.4 Equity in Psychology 4.5 Equity in Anthropology 4.5.1 Sharing and Caring 4.5.2 Enforcement in Foraging Societies 4.5.3 Anarchy in Prehistory7 4.5.4 Kinship in Small Groups 4.6 The Game of Morals 4.6.1 Fair Social Contracts 4.6.2 Paradise Lost 4.6.3 Modeling the Original Position 4.6.4 When iS Justice Dispensed7 4.6.5 Rawls Vindicated 4.6.6 Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run 4.6.7 Consensus and Context 4.6.8 Morality in the Short Run 4.6.9 Egalitarianism versus Utilitarianism 4.6.10 Paradise Regained7 4.7 worthiness and Power 4.7.1 Wm to Power7 4.7.2 Comparative Statics 4.7.3 T0 Each According to His Need7 4.7.4 Arbeit Macht Frei7 4.7.5 nom Each According to His Ability7 4.7.6 The High and the Lowly 4.7.7 Socialism versus Capitalism 4.8 The Market and the Long Run 4.8.1 The Walrasian Bargaining Solution 4.8.2 Misrepresenting Personal Preferences
4.8.3 The Concept of a Fair Price 4.8.4 Time Corrupts An 4.9 Unfinished Business 4.9.1 Large Societies and Coalitions 4.9.2 Incomplete Information and Mechanism Design 4.9.3 A Changing Game of Life 4.10 A Perfect Commonwealth7 4.10.1 What is Whiggery7 4.10.2 Where is Whiggery7 4.11 Humea~and Humane Appendices A Really Meaning It A.1 NaturMism A.1.1 Causal Reversals A.2 Modeling Man A.2.1 Strength of Body A.2.2 Reason A.2.3 Passions A.2.4 Experience B Harsanyi Scholarship B.1 IntrOduction B.2 Teleological Utilitarianism B.3 Nonteleological Utilitarianism C Bargaining Theory C.1 Introduction C.2 Alternating Ofiers Game C.3 Preferences C.4 Stationary Subgame—Perfect Equilibria C.5 Nonstationary Equilibria C.6 Generalized Nash Bargaining Solutions C.7 Nash Program Bibliography Index
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