Apology Reading Guide Abstract of Volume Ⅱ 1 A Liberal Leviathan 1.1 Whiggery 1.2 DeKanting Rawls 1.2.1 Hobbes and the State of Nature 1.2.2 Sen and the Rational Fool 1.2.3 Hume and the Social Contract 1.2.4 Schelling and Commitment 1.2.5 Rawls and Utility 1.2.6 Adam Smith and Human Sympathy 1.2.7 Harsanyi and Ideal Observers 1.2.8 Pareto and Mutual Consent 1.2.9 Gauthier and Rational Contracting 1.3 Behemoth and the Market 1.4 Elephants and Donkeys 2 Toying with Tautologies 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Equilibrium 2.2.1 Hawks and Doves 2.2.2 Equilibrium 2.2.3 Prisoners' Dilemma 2.2.4 Means and Ends 2.2.5 Suppose Everyone Behaved Like That? 2.2.6 Games That are Not the Prisoners' Dilemma 2.3 Games and the Social Contract 2.3.1 The State of Nature as a Game 2.3.2 Hunting Stags 2.3.3 Rights and the Liberal Paradox 2.3.4 Arrow's Paradox 2.3.5 Teleology 2.3.6 Jacob's Ladder 2.3.7 Rawls' Two Principles of Justice 2.4 My Dear Sir, Clear Your Mind of Cant! 2.4.1 The Categorical Imperative 2.4.2 Why Obey? 2.4.3 Be Consistent! 2.5 Time and Commitment 2.5.1 Blackmail 2.5.2 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium 2.6 Really Meaning It 3 Squaring the Circle 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Transparent Disposition Fallacies 3.2.1 "Metagames" 3.2.2 Constrained Maximization 3.2.3 Cheap Talk and Evolution 3.2.4 Cheap Talk and Equilibrium Selection 3.2.5 The Tit-for-Tat Bubble
3.3 The Symmetry Fallacy 3.4 Paradox of the Twins 3.4.1 The Harsanyi Doctrine 3.4.2 Hobbesian Psychology 3.5 Newcomb's Paradox 3.6 Paradox of the Surprise Test 4 Cardinal Comparisons 4.1 Ordinal and Cardinal Utility 4.2 Intrapersonal Comparison of Utility 4.2.1 Probability 4.2.2 Von Neumann and Morgenstern Utility 4.2.3 Intensity of Preference 4.2.4 Teleological Utilitarianism 4.3 Interpersonal Comparison of Utility 4.3.1 Empathetic Preferences 4.3.2 Common Interpersonal Comparisons 4.4 Kant and the Prisoners' Dilemma 4.5 Bayesian Decision Theory 4.6 Rawlsian Maximin 4.7 The Game of Morals Bibiography Index
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