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信念知識和實踐問題(英文版)

  • 作者:高潔|責編:周燁楠
  • 出版社:浙江大學
  • ISBN:9787308246798
  • 出版日期:2024/02/01
  • 裝幀:平裝
  • 頁數:248
人民幣:RMB 88 元      售價:
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內容大鋼
    本書聚焦于當代分析哲學知識論領域的前沿論題實踐侵入知識論(pragmatic encroachment),對知識、信念認識態度與實踐之間的關係提出了一系列原創觀點。實踐侵入知識論主張知識等認識態度與實踐因素之間具有緊密聯繫,主要訴諸知識與行動之間的一系列直觀的聯繫,包括支持知識是理性行動的認識規範的直覺判斷和知識歸賦對實踐因素的敏感性。本書通過辨析信念與實踐因素之間的關聯對以上知識與行動之間的關聯進行了解釋,辯護了可錯論的溫和不變主義。

作者介紹
高潔|責編:周燁楠
    高潔,愛丁堡大學哲學博士,現為浙江大學哲學學院研究員, Asian Journal of Philosophy(《亞洲哲學雜誌》)副主編,約翰內斯堡大學高級研究員。主要研究方向為知識論,也涉及心智哲學、決策論、認知哲學和語言學中相關內容。

目錄
Introduction
PART Ⅰ Pars Destruens
1.Knowledge and Practical Matters
  1.1  Practical factor effects on knowledge ascriptions
  1.2 The knowledge norm ofpractical reasoning
  l.3 Pragmatic encroachment on knowledge
  1.4  Problems for pragmatic encroachment
  1.5  Moderate invariantist accounts ofthe practical factor eicects on knowledge ascriptions
  1.6  Criticisms to the knowledge norm ofpractical reasoning
  1.7  Concluding remarks
2.Hilgh Stakes and Iterated-knowledge
  2.1  The iterated knowledge account ofhigh-stakes cases
  2.2  Counterintuitive appropriateness
  2.3  Higher-order reasoning/knowledge and practical rationality
  2.4  Non-luminosity,higher-order belief and blameworthiness
  2.5  Concluding remarks
3 Rational Action Without Knowledge(and Vice Versa)
  3.1  The epistemic norlTls ofpractical reasoning
  3.2  Counterexample one:rational action based on acceptance
  3.3 Counterexample two:rational action performed by the sceptic
  3.4  The excuse manoeuvre
  3.5 Concluding remarks
4.Doxastic Accounts
  4.1  Weatherson』s doxastic pragmatism
  4.2  Ganson』S doxastic pragmatism
  4.3  Objections to Weatherson and Ganson』s accounts
  4.4  Bach』s doxastic pragmatism m
  4.5 Nagel』s psychological account
  4.6  Objections to Bach and Nagel』s accounts
  4.7  Concluding remarks
PART Ⅱ Pars Construens
5.Credal Pragmatism
  5.1  Two types ofpractical factors
  5.2  Threshold pragmatism and credal pragmatism
  5.3  Credal pragmatism Vs.threshold pragmatism
  5.4  Objections and replies
  5.5  Three dimensions ofepistemic rationality
  5.6  Concluding remarks
6.Credal Pragmatism and the Distinction Between Dispositional Beliefand
Oecurrent Belief
  6.1  Dispositional belief and occurrent belief
  6.2  Dispositional belief,occurrent belief and practical factor effects
  6.3  Diagnoses ofhigh-stakes cases
  6.4  Concluding remarks
7.Fallibilism and the Knowledge Norm ofPractical Reasoning
  7.1  Fallibilism and the knowledge norm ofpractical reasoning
  7.2  Threshold makers and communicative heuristic accounts
  7.3  The infallibilist intuition and the knowledge norm ofpractical reasoning
  7.4  Concluding remarks
Concluding Remarks

Bibliography
Index

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